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MATTER OFA-T-: OPENING THE DOOR FOR GENDER AS A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS
KELLEEN O'FALLON*
Ami Doumbouye was 10 years old when five women in
her village in the Ivory Coast held her head, arms, and
legs as another woman tried to slice her clitoris off with
a sharp thumbnail. Thirty minutes later, when that
method did not work, the women turned to the knife
they had used on seven girls before her.
Doumbouye could not walk for a week. Now thirty-
eight years old and living across the world in New York
City's South Bronx, she says she does not feel anything
between her legs.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Matter of A-T-,2 United States Attorney General Michael B.
Mukasey ("Mukasey"), at the request of women's and human rights
groups,3 reviewed a 2007 Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
decision that denied a Malian woman's asylum claim based on her
subjection to female genital mutilation ("FGM").4 He concluded that
the BIA had made several errors of fact and law.5 According to his
analysis, the BIA erred in characterizing FGM as a one-time injury as
opposed to an ongoing injury with lifelong effects.6 In addition,
Mukasey concluded that the BIA misinterpreted the law by requiring
that the asylum applicant's fear of future persecution be based on
Copyright © 2010 by Kelleen O'Fallon.
* J.D. Candidate, 2010. University of Maryland School of Law. B.A., English and Spanish,
2007. Saint Joseph's University. The author would like to thank Maureen Sweeney for her
help in selecting the topic.
1. Zainab Zakari, FGM Asylum Cases Forge New Legal Standing, WOMEN'S E-NEWS,
Nov. 25, 2008, http://www.womensenews.org/story/the-courts/081125/fgm-asylum-cases-
forge-new-legal-standing.
2. Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (A.G. 2008).
3. Trymaine Lee, Mukaskey Vacates Panel's Decision Denying Asylum to Malian
Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at AI8.
4. See In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 301 (B.I.A. 2007), vacated, Matter of A-T-, 24
I. & N. Dec. 617, 617 (A.G. 2008).
5. Matter ofA-T-, 24 I. & N. at 621-22.
6. Id at 621.
398 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 9:397
exactly the same factual persecution she experienced in the past.7 In
other words, the BIA erred in holding that because the applicant had
already undergone FGM, she could not claim fear of future
persecution. 8 Rather, Mukasey argued, the asylum applicant's fear of
future persecution must be based on the same statutory grounds as the
past persecution, i.e. asylum law's social-group analysis, and not the
same persecution itself.9
In his opinion, Mukasey urged the BIA to reconsider its
approach to these applications and also provided the federal courts
with the proper guidance. First, Mukasey argued against the peculiar
position held by FGM-related cases within the context of our asylum
law. 10 In so doing, Mukasey prevented the formation of an arbitrary
distinction between asylum applicants, whereby all asylum claims
brought by victims of past FGM would have been denied, while all
asylum claims brought by applicants who had not undergone FGM but
feared it, would have been viable.1' In addition, by applying statutory
requirements (membership in a particular social group), instead of
analyzing only the type of persecution the applicant suffers, FGM can
be more readily observed as one of the many types of persecution that
women of certain social groups face. 12 The focus turns to the social
group of women, and how its members suffer on account of belonging
to that group within a particular context, which is the proper
interpretation of asylum law's nexus requirement. As a result, social-
group asylum claims based on gender may become a viable option for
asylum applicants: a needed expansion of the law that has been




FGM "comprises all procedures that involve partial or total
removal of the external female genitalia, or other injury to the female
genital organs for non-medical reasons."' 4 There are four types of
7. Id.
8. Id. at 622.
9. Id.
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra Part III.B.
12. See infra Part III.C.
13. See infra Part III.D.
14. World Health Org. [WHO], Female Genital Mutilation: Fact Sheet, at 1, Fact Sheet
No. 241 (May 2008), available at
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FGM. 15 The first is a clitoridectomy procedure that involves partially
or totally removing the clitoris 16 and, less commonly, the prepuce 17 as
well.18 The, second is an excision procedure that consists of partial or
total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, with or without
excision of the labia majora. 19 The third is an infibulation procedure
that involves narrowing the vaginal opening through the creation of a
covering seal. The seal is formed by cutting and repositioning the
inner, and sometimes outer, labia, with or without removal of the
clitoris. The fourth type consists of "all other harmful procedures to
the female genitalia for non-medical purposes," such as "pricking,
piercing, incising, scraping and cauterizing the genital area., 21 This
last practice is most prevalent in the western, eastern, and north-
eastern regions of Africa, in some countries in Asia and the Middle
East, and among certain immigrant groups in North America and22
Europe. There are "[b]etween 100 to 140 million girls and women
worldwide living with the consequences of FGM." 23 Of that total,
ninety-two million African girls and women over the age of ten have
undergone FGM.2 4 The procedure is usually carried out on young girls
under the age of fifteen.
FGM provides no health benefits whatsoever. 26 FGM actually
harms the female body because it interferes with its normal functions
by removing and damaging healthy and normal female genital tissue.
2 7
The immediate health consequences of FGM include: "severe pain,2 8
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/print.html [hereinafter Female Genital
Mutilation: Fact Sheet].
15. Id.
16. The clitoris "is a small, sensitive and erectile part of the female genitals." Id.
17. The "prepuce is the fold of skin surrounding the clitoris." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. "[T]he labia are 'the lips' that surround the vagina." Id.
20. Id. at 2. Those who experience the procedure often have their legs bound together
for several days or weeks thereafter. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, et
al., Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, at 11, (2008), available
at http://www.unifem.org/ attachments/products/fgm-statement_2008_eng.pdf [hereinafter
Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement].







28. "Cutting the nerve ends and sensitive genital tissue causes extreme pain. Proper
anesthesia is rarely used and, when used, not always effective. The healing period is also
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shock, hemorrhage (bleeding), tetanus or sepsis (bacterial infection),
urine retention, open sores in the genital region and injury to nearby
genital tissue." 29 The long-term physical consequences of FGM may
include recurrent bladder and urinary tract infections, cysts, infertility,
additional surgeries, increased risks of childbirth complications and
newborn deaths, painful sexual intercourse, death from hemorrhage or
infection, and increased risk of contracting the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV).31 In addition, FGM poses negative
psychological consequences, including "an increased likelihood of fear
of sexual intercourse, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety,
depression, and memory loss.32
FGM is a human rights violation.33 "Seen from a human rights
perspective, the practice reflects deep-rooted inequality between the
sexes, and constitutes an extreme form of discrimination against
women." 34 Indeed, social, religious, and cultural factors based on
inequality between the sexes explain why FGM is so widely practiced.
As to social factors, many communities consider FGM a necessary
part of raising a female properly; the procedure is "a way to prepare
her for adulthood and marriage." 35 FGM is often motivated by a social
belief that females who undergo the procedure exhibit "proper" sexual
behavior, including premarital virginity and marital fidelity;
communities may believe that FGM helps women resist sexual acts.
36
As to religious factors, "[t]hough no religious scripts prescribe the
practice, practitioners often believe the practice has religious
support."3 Finally, as to cultural factors, "FGM is associated with
cultural ideals of femininity and modesty, which includes the notion
that girls are 'clean' and 'beautiful' after removal of body parts that
painful." Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, supra note 20, at
33.
29. Id.
30. "Infibulations must be opened (defibulation) later in life to enable penetration during
sexual intercourse and for childbirth. In some countries it is usual to follow this by re-closure
(reinfibulation) and hence the need for repeated defibulation later. Re-closure is also
reportedly done on other occasions." Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency
Statement, supra note 20, at 35.
31. Id. at 34-35.
32. Id. at 34.
33. Female Genital Mutilation: Fact Sheet, supra note 14, at 1; Eliminating Female
Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, supra note 20, at 9.
34. Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, supra note 20,
at 1.
35. Female Genital Mutilation: Fact Sheet, supra note 14, at 2.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 3.
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are considered 'male' or 'unclean."' 38  Thus, the international
community considers FGM as indicative of patriarchal cultures.
39
Within these cultures, women are held victim to a "larger system of
female subjugation," where in addition to FGM, women may also be at
risk for forced marriage, domestic violence, marital rape, and other
related harms within the practices of that system.n
B. Asylum and Other Forms of Immigration Relief
The United States derives its modem asylum law from the
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
("1951 Convention") 4' and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees ("1967 Protocol"). 2 The 1951 Convention and its 1967
Protocol are codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
("INA")43 and the Refugee Act of 1980.44 To be eligible for asylum in
the United States, an applicant has the burden of showing that she
qualifies as a refugee. a A "refugee," is any person outside the country
of her nationality who can show a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of any of the five following grounds: race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. The "on account of' language is significant. The nexus
requirement involves a two-step process: "the identification of the
relevant Convention ground, followed by the establishment of the
38. Id.
39. "As female genital mutilation is a manifestation of gender inequality, the
empowerment of women is of key importance to the elimination of the practice." Eliminating
Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, supra note 20, at 15.
40. Lisa Frydman & Kim Thuy Seelinger, Kasinga's Protection Undermined ? Recent
Developments in Female Genital Cutting Jurisprudence, 13 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1073,
1075 (Sept. 1, 2008).
41. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
42. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267.
43. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
44. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (3)(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (a) (2009).
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A). Although the INA does not define "persecution," see
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 220 (B.I.A. 1985), modified on other grounds, Matter
of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (B.I.A. 1987), the Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA") has interpreted persecution to include serious threats to an individual's life or
freedom, or the infliction of significant harm. Matter ofAcosta, 19 I. & N., at 222.
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causal connection between this ground and the persecution. 47 The
nexus requirement tightened in 2005 with the Real ID Act; asylum
applicants must prove that one of the statutory grounds was or would
be at least one central reason for the claimed persecution.
48
If the applicant demonstrates that she has already been subject
to past persecution on account of one of the grounds recognized by the
1951 Convention, then the applicant is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of a well-founded fear of returning to her native country
based on the same ground.49 Conversely, if the applicant's fear of
future persecution is unrelated to the past persecution, the applicant
does not receive the benefit of the presumption; she must still show her
future fear is well-founded.5 ° In addition, the asylum applicant must
show that her native country is unwilling or unable to protect her from
the persecution. 5' Thus, the applicant has the burden of demonstrating
that her fear is "country-wide. 52 This concept is derived from the
traditional notion of a refugee as an individual where the "bonds of
trust, loyalty, protection and assistance" between her and her country
have been broken, and have been replaced by the relation of an
oppressor to a victim.53 An asylum applicant must show that the
persecution she experienced or fears was inflicted upon her by the
government of her country of origin, or was inflicted upon her by a
group that the government of her country of origin was unable or
unwilling to control.54
Finally, the asylum applicant must demonstrate that her
application was filed within one year after the date of her entry into the
United States. 55 Due to this limited time requirement, many asylum
47. Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A
Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 777, 783 (2003).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (3)(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006) (The Real ID Act of 2005 amended various
sections of the INA relating to the adjudication of asylum applications. Pub. L. No. 109-13,
Div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (2005)).
49. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b) (2009).
50. Id.
51. Id. Note as well that asylum is a discretionary form of immigration relief; an
applicant who establishes statutory eligibility has to demonstrate that she merits a grant of
asylum as a matter of discretion. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427-28 (1987).
52. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 235 (B.I.A. 1985). A well-founded fear of
persecution cannot exist within the asylum schema if the applicant could relocate to another
part of her country of origin to avoid the persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b)(1)(i)(B).
53. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 235.
54. See e.g., Matter of Villalta, 20 1. & N. Dec. 142, 147 (B.I.A. 1990) (concluding that
a male applying for political asylum had a well-founded fear of persecution because the
government of El Salvador was unable to control his persecutor's activities).
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a)(2)(B) (2009).
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applications miss the deadline. These applicants then try to qualify for
withholding of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a)(2)(B) (2009)56
or the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT").57 These
three forms of immigration relief, asylum derived from the 1951
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, withholding pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1158 (a)(2)(B), and withholding under the CAT, are generally pursued
by females applying for FGM-based relief, although asylum is
generally preferred given its lower burden of proof. Consequently, this
Comment will focus more on asylum than withholding.
C. Kasinga as Starting Ground for FGM Claims
FGM-based asylum was first approved by the BIA in In re
Kasinga,58 where a woman who feared subjection to FGM upon herv. 59
return to her native Togo was granted asylum. The asylum applicant
fled Togo to avoid a polygamous forced marriage; her future husband
required that she undergo FGM prior to the wedding day. The BIA
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3) (2009). To qualify for withholding of removal, the applicant
must establish that her life or freedom would be threatened in her country of origin because of
her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Id.
"While closely related to an application for asylum, withholding of removal requires
satisfaction of a higher burden of proof." Dieng v. Mukasey, No. 06-1622, 2008 WL 2647575,
at *10 (4th. Cir. July 7, 2008) (unpublished), quoting Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361,
367 (4th Cir. 2004). An applicant must show that it is more likely than not that her "life or
freedom would be threatened ... because of [her] race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion" if she returned to her native country. 8 U.S.C. §
1231 (b)(3)(A) (2009), 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (b)(1) (2009). Because the burden of proof for
withholding of removal is higher than for asylum-even though the facts that must be proved
are the same-an applicant who is ineligible for asylum is necessarily ineligible for
withholding of removal. Camara, 378 F.3d at 367. If an applicant qualifies for withholding of
removal, the Attorney General cannot remove her to her native country. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)
(2009).
57. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984);
Pub. L. 105-277 (1998) (hereinafter CAT). To qualify for relief under the CAT, the applicant
must show that it is more likely than not that she would be tortured if removed to the proposed
country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (c)(2) (2009). "Torture" is defined, for the purposes of
the FGM analysis, as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (a)(1) (2009). In addition, the act must
be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering on the victim. 8
C.F.R. § 208.18 (a)(5) (2009).
58. In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
59. Id. at 358.
60. Id.
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concluded that the applicant qualified as a refugee because FGM
constituted "persecution" and the applicant had a well-founded fear of
that persecution. 61 The BIA held that she demonstrated her well-
founded fear of persecution based on her membership to a particular
social group, a group defined as "young women of the Tchamba-
Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and
who oppose the practice.
62
The applicant must first identify the persecuted social group in
which she alleges she is a member. The members of such a group must
"share a common, immutable characteristic." 63 In Kasinga, the BIA
noted how the characteristics of being a young woman and a member
of the Tchama-Kunsuntu Tribe cannot be changed, and how having
intact genitalia is a characteristic "so fundamental to the individual
identity of a young woman that she should not be required to change
it."'64 The BIA particularly emphasized the importance of the nexus
between the particular social group and the persecution: "FGM is
practiced, at least in some significant part, to overcome sexual
characteristics of young women of the tribe who have not been, and do
not wish to be, subjected to FGM.' ,65 Significant also to the BIA's
analysis was Togo's "minimal effort" or lack thereof to protect women
61. Id. at 365. The BIA stated that "persecution" can consist of the infliction of harm or
suffering by the government or persons the government is unwilling or unable to control. Id.
In addition, the BIA noted that a subjective "punitive" or "malignant" intent is not required for
harm to constitute persecution. Id. This qualification is significant, because the practice of
FGM is often culturally condoned and inflicted by the female's family members. Eliminating
Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, supra note 20, at 5-6.
62. In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. at 365-66.
63. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1996). Id. at 233. "[W]hatever the
common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the members of the group
either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their
individual identities or consciences." Id. Since Acosta and Kasinga, the BIA has required that
the common characteristic lend the group sufficient social visibility to make the group readily
identifiable in society. See Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959-60 (B.I.A. 2006); Matter
of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (B.I.A. 2007). This Note does not focus on this
requirement, because females are generally visible as females within society. See Matter of C-
A-, 23 I. & N. at 959 ("Social groups based on innate characteristics such as sex or family
relationship are generally easily recognizable and understood by others to constitute social
groups."). Also, because FGM is culturally condoned, considered a female rite of passage, and
is frequently imposed by family or community members, it follows that the women who have
experienced or have yet to experience the procedure are generally known by the populace.
64. In reKasinga, 21 I. &N. at 366.
65. Id. at 367.
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66from FGM, and how women subjected to the practice could
experience serious life-threatening health complications.
67
D. Confusion in Kasinga 's Wake
In Kasinga's wake, bringing FGM-based asylum claims via the
social group analysis became a viable option for applicants. However,
Kasinga dealt only with asylum applications based on a fear of FGM
in the future. As a result, the case law on asylum applications
involving FGM in the past became muddled, as the BIA and the circuit
courts differed in their treatment of asylum claims brought by women
who had already undergone the procedure. The Ninth Circuit in
Mohammed v. Gonzales has provided the most supportive case from
the federal circuits for asylum based on past FGM. M8 In Mohammed,
the court held that the Somali applicant was part of a persecuted social
group, and, therefore, eligible for asylum either as a young girl of the
Benadiri clan, or as a Somali female. 69 The Ninth Circuit noted how
the "possession of the immutable trait of being female is a motivating
factor-if not a but-for cause of the persecution [of FGM]. 7 ° In
another supportive case, the Eighth Circuit in Hassan v. Gonzalez
reached a similar conclusion.71 In construing a Somali woman's
application based on past FGM, the court noted that the applicant
suffered from the practice on account of being a member of the social
group of Somali females.
72
66. Id. at 362. Thus, under this analysis Togo was unwilling or unable to protect the
applicant from FGM.
67. Id. at 361.
68. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005). Lisa Frydman & Kim Thuy
Seelinger, Kasinga's Protection Undermined ? Recent Developments in Female Genital
Cutting Jurisprudence, 13 Bender's Immigration Bulletin. 1073, 1076 (Sept. 1, 2008) (writing
in September 2008 that Mohammed is the most supportive case to issue from the federal
circuits thus far).
69. Id. at 796-98.
70. Id. at 798 ("[W]e conclude that Mohammed's claim that she was persecuted on
account of her membership in a social group, whether it be defined as the social group
comprised of Somalian females, or a more narrowly circumscribed group, such as young girls
in the Benadiri clan, not only reflects a plausible construction of our asylum law, but the only
plausible construction.") (emphasis added).
71. Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007).
72. Id. "[W]e hold that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that all Somali females
have a well-founded fear of persecution based solely on gender given the prevalence of
FGM." Id. Notably also, the social groups accepted by the 9th and 8th Circuits are not as
particularized as the social group accepted by the BIA in Kasinga. This difference becomes
relevant to the floodgates concern discussed in Part III.D, infra.
2009]
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What is remarkable about the Ninth Circuit's analysis was how
it defined FGM as a permanent and ongoing act of persecution,
marking a landmark development in how courts have considered
FGM.73  For example, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits74 have
characterized FGM as a one-time injury that cannot be repeated. Thus,
these courts have concluded that the applicant cannot be entitled to the
presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution based on her past
persecution (of FGM) 75 because there is no chance she would be made
to endure the procedure again.76 The applicant cannot successfully
carry her burden of proof under this analysis without the benefit of the
presumption, because she has no persecution left to fear.7 7 Thus,
characterizing FGM as a one-time injury prevents applicants already
subjected to FGM from obtaining asylum based on a claim of past
FGM as persecution.78
In concluding that FGM is a permanent and ongoing act of
persecution, the Ninth Circuit noted how the procedure permanently
disfigures a female, causes long-term health problems, and deprives
her of a normal and fulfilling sexual life. 79 Akin to victims of forced
sterilization, females who have suffered FGM "necessarily have an
inherent well-founded fear of future persecution because such persons
will be persecuted for the remainder of their lives." 80 The court stated
how, practically speaking, FGM cannot be defined as a one-time
injury; in many cultures oftentimes several surgeries are done to
"complete" the process of FGM.81 As a result, the applicant in
Mohammed may have already undergone FGM, but her subjection to
an initial procedure did not prevent her from undergoing a more severe
procedure upon her return. 82 Finally, the court explained how the
73. Mohammed, 400 F.3d. at 799-800.
74. Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 615 (7th Cir. 2003); Seifu v. Ashcroft, No. 03-
60142, 2003 WL 22490221 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2003).
75. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (2009).
76. Oforji, 354 F.3d at 615; Seifu, 2003 WL 22490221 at *323-24.
77. Oforji, 354 F.3d at 617; Selfu, 2003 WL 22490221 at *323-24.
78. Oforji, 354 F.3d at 615; Seifu, 2003 WL 22490221 at *323-24.
79. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 799-800 (9th Cir. 2005).
80. Id. at 799 (internal citations omitted).
81. Id. at 800-01.
82. Id. The Somalian applicant in Mohammed had been subjected to a procedure that
removed her clitoris and her prepuce. Id. at 801. Eighty percent of Somalian women are
subjected to infibulation, however, where the genital lips are completely stitched together. Id.
at 800.
MATTER OF A-T-
conditions in Somalia generally foster an atmosphere where women
are at risk for subordination and harm.
83
The Ninth and Eighth Circuit's interpretations of gender-based
asylum applications suggest that the future persecution the victim fears
need not be subjection to the procedure again. Rather, a woman who
has already been subjected to FGM could fear other forms of gender-
based violence upon her return to her country of origin. For example,
by recognizing Somalia's oppressive atmosphere against women, the
Ninth Circuit suggested that FGM need not be the only form of
persecution that a past victim of FGM may fear. The Eighth Circuit
stated a similar idea: asylum law does not require that the applicant
fear the repetition of the same actual harm that she has suffered in the
past to receive the benefit of the rebuttable presumption. 84 According
to the Ninth and Eighth Circuit's analyses, if the applicant can show
she was already persecuted based on her membership in a particular
social group, it is presumed that she would have a well-founded fear of
persecution if she were forced to return.
E. Matter of A-T-: The BIA and Attorney General Mukasey
1. In re A-T-: The BIA's Analysis of Past FGM Asylum Claims
In In re A-T-,85 the BIA considered whether an immigration
judge erred in denying a Malian woman's 86 applications for asylum
and withholding of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a)(2)(B)
(2009) and CAT.87 The applicant entered the United States on a
visitor's visa on October 4, 2000 and applied for asylum on May 12,
200488 on the grounds that she had been subjected to FGM as a young
83. "[T]he subordination and persecution of women in Somalia is not limited to genital
mutilation." Id. ("[W]omen are subordinated systematically in the country's overwhelmingly
patriarchal culture, and rape is commonly practiced in inter-clan conflicts.") (internal citations
omitted).
84. 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that the INA's definition of persecution is
"not that narrow").
85. In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296 (B.I.A. 2007), vacated, Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 617 (A.G. 2008).
86. Her name was not disclosed in the BIA decision or in Mukaskey's Opinion.
However, following Mukaskey's Opinion, the New York Times identified her as twenty-eight-
year-old Alima Traore. Trymaine Lee, Mukaskey Vacates Panel's Decision Denying Asylum
to Malian Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at A18.
87. Proceedings before immigration judges are oral proceedings, and no written opinion
regarding this first proceeding before the immigration judge is available.
88. The one-year bar to asylum claims did apply in her case. Therefore, her actual
immigration relief was withholding of removal.
2009]
408 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 9:397
girl.89 She said she was opposed to the practice of FGM, and that if she
had a daughter in the future she would actively oppose subjecting her
child to the procedure. 90 The applicant said that her father in Mali had
arranged for her to marry her first cousin, and that she feared the
consequences of refusing to comply with her family's wishes.
91
In its decision, the BIA first distinguished her case from
Kasinga by noting the factual difference between confronting an
imminent threat of FGM and already having been subjected to FGM.
The BIA then adopted an approach akin to that of the Seventh and
Fifth Circuits, stating that "even assuming arguendo that she is a
member of a particular social group92 who suffered past persecution,
'there is no chance that she would be personally [persecuted] again by
the procedure.' 93 The BIA disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's analysis
in Mohammed, stating that asylum claims based on past FGM do not
qualify as "continuing harms." 94 As a result, the BIA concluded, the
government successfully rebutted the applicant's presumption of
future harm based on her past persecution of FGM, because "any
presumption of future FGM persecution is thus rebutted by the
fundamental change in the respondent's situation arising from the
reprehensible, but one-time, infliction of FGM upon her."' 9 The BIA
required that the persecution the applicant fears factually match the
persecution she experienced in the past to receive the benefit of the
rebuttable presumption.
89. The applicant had no memory of the mutilation. In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. at 296. The
World Health Organization has noted, however, that at times victims of FGM block out
memories of the experience due to psychological trauma. Eliminating Female Genital
Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, supra note 20, at 34.
90. InreA-T-,24 I.& N. at296.
91. Id.
92. The BIA did not analyze whether her social group qualified as a particular social
group under the Acosta test, and therefore also whether she was persecuted on account of her
membership in that social group.
93. In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. at 299 (citing Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 615 (7th Cir.
2003).
94. Id. at 300.
95. Id. at 299 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 (b)(1)(i)(A)(i) (2009) ("If the applicant is
determined to have suffered past persecution in the proposed country of removal on account of
[one of the five grounds], it shall be presumed that the applicant's life or freedom would be
threatened in the future in the country of removal on the basis of the original claim. This
presumption may be rebutted if an [] immigration judge finds by a preponderance of the
evidence [that] there has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant's
life or freedom would not be threatened on account of any of the five grounds mentioned in
this paragraph upon the applicant's removal to that country.")).
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The applicant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied.96 In her motion, the applicant asserted that "it is not the means
or forms of persecution that must be linked, but the reasons the victim
is singled out for harm," meaning her membership in a particular
social group.97 She followed by saying that the FGM she experienced
as a child and the treatment she feared upon returning to Mali, in the
form of a forced, arranged marriage, were linked because she was
vulnerable to both as a member of a particular social group.98 The BIA
denied the motion in an unpublished order, stating that it "was unable
to conclude on this particular record that the respondent had met her
burden of proof for such a claim." 99
2. Matter of A-T-: Attorney General Mukasey's Analysis
In Matter of A-T-,100 Mukasey vacated In Re A-T- because he
concluded the BIA had made two errors,101 and charged the BIA to
reevaluate its decision in accordance with his opinion.102 First,
Mukasey noted that the BIA erred in concluding that FGM cannot
occur more than once.10 3 Second, Mukasey concluded that the BIA
erred when it required that any future harm to the applicant must take
precisely the same form as the past persecution.10
4
First, Mukasey stated that FGM is capable of repetition, given
the regularity of repeated mutilating procedures.' 0 5 While he did not
characterize FGM as an ongoing injury, Mukasey described how
women who have already been subjected to FGM frequently undergo
further extracting and mutilating procedures.' °6 For example, women
with partially-removed genitals may be subjected to additional
removal procedures or to infibulation.0 He noted how some women
experience multiple infibulation procedures throughout their lives, and
cited to a recent BIA decision where an asylum applicant's vaginal
96. Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617, 621 (A.G. 2008).
97. Id. at 620.
98. Id. at 621.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Matter ofA-T-, 24 I. & N. at 618.
102. Id. at 623.
103. Id. at 621.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Matter ofA-T-, 24 I. & N. at 620, n.3.
107. Id.
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opening was sewn shut approximately five times, after being opened to
allow for sexual intercourse and child birth. 1
08
Second, Mukasey concluded that the BIA "was wrong to focus
on whether the future harm to life or freedom that she feared would
take the 'identical' form-namely, [FGM]-as the harm she had suffered
in the past."'10 9 Rather, when an applicant shows that she has suffered
past persecution, it is presumed her life or freedom would be
threatened upon her return to her native country on account of the
same statutory grounds. 10 Accordingly, Mukasey stated that the
applicant's claim was not FGM persecution, but rather persecution on
account of membership in a particular social group." To rebut the
presumption of future persecution, therefore, the government must
demonstrate that the applicant no longer is at risk on account of her
membership within the particular social group, instead of showing that
the particular act of persecution suffered by the victim in the past will
not occur again. 2
III. ANALYSIS
Mukasey properly evaluated Matter of A-T-, and helped resolve
the conflicts that had been developing between the adjudicators of
these applications at the administrative and federal appellate levels. He
re-positioned asylum applications involving FGM within the proper
social-group-analysis framework, correcting its singular or different
status from other asylum applications. He correctly interpreted asylum
law's nexus requirement, by concluding that a victim of FGM cannot
have her social-group claim rebutted merely on the grounds that she
cannot be subjected to the procedure again. In so doing, Mukasey
prevented the formation of an arbitrary distinction between asylum
applicants: where all applicants fearing FGM in the future on social-
group grounds would have viable claims, but those social-group
applicants claiming asylum based on FGM in the past would have
been denied.
By considering the rebuttal analysis based on the statutory
grounds (membership in a particular social group) instead of the type
of persecution the applicant suffers, FGM can be more readily
108. Id. (citing Matter of S-A-K- & H-A-H-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 464, 465 (B.I.A. 2008)).
109. Id. at 622.
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. Matter of A-T-, 24 1. & N. at 622-23 (citing Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 115 (2d
Cir. 2008)).
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observed by adjudicators as one of the many types of persecution
women face. FGM serves as an indicator of the widespread and varied
forms of subjugation that women within certain societies and cultures
confront. FGM is no longer the legal basis of the application; rather,
the application's legal basis is the persecution of the female on account
of her status as a member of a particular social group. As a result,
social-group asylum applications based on gender may become a
viable option for asylum applicants, because the social group is
necessarily defined by the woman's status as a female.
A. The Problems with Treating FGM Asylum Applications as
Different
FGM applications have traditionally been brought via the
social-group analysis of asylum law, starting with Kasinga and
following in its wake. 1 3 Applicants are granted asylum via the social-
group analysis when the applicant shares a common, immutable
characteristic with the other members of the social group." 4 Examples
include a labor activist who is persecuted for organizing activity, or a
man, perceived as a homosexual, who is raped and forced into
prostitution."15 However, for claimants who have been genitally
mutilated, courts traditionallyX considered only the specific harm and
not the basis for the harm.1  Unlike other social-group applications
where the applicant's identity is evaluated as a cause of the
persecution (i.e., the proper nexus analysis-where the labor activist is
persecuted on account of his membership in a particular labor-party
social group), in a case involving FGM, the woman's identity does not
matter as much as the act of mutilation itself. 1 7 Indeed, the BIA in In
re A-T- discussed at length whether to characterize FGM as a one-time
or an ongoing injury, but only assumed "arguendo" that the applicant
was a member of a particular social group.18
113. See e.g. Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 2007); Mohammed v. Gonzales,
400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
114. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,233 (B.I.A. 1996).
115. Valena Elizabeth Beety, Comment, Reframing Asylum Standards for Mutilated
Women, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 239, 255 (Winter 2008) (citing Bu v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d
424, 426-27 (6th Cir. 2007), Pozos v. Gonzales, No. 03-70536, 2005 WL 1901549, at *631
(9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2005)).
116. Id. at 240 (citing Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2003)).
117. Id.
118. In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 299 (B.I.A. 2007) ("In Kasinga, [] the applicant had
not yet undergone FGM and was facing an imminent threat of being subjected to the
procedure if returned to her country of origin. The respondent in this case has already
undergone FGM. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that she is a member of a particular
2009]
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As a result of this peculiar approach to FGM asylum
applications, victims of past FGM have an impossible battle. Our
immigration system was designed to grant asylum to those applicants
who can prove why they were persecuted and on what statutory
basis-i.e., on account of their membership in a particular social
group. However, for applicants who are victims of past FGM, their
likelihood of success is based on an evaluation of the mutilated act
itself rather than the underlying basis for persecution. When the
application is based on the act of persecution, rather than the applicant
and the reason for the persecution, she cannot prove she was harmed
based on her identity: "[t]hus, other persecution she could or did face,
such as prostitution or social exile, does not matter because it cannot
be connected to female genital mutilation.'"
119
Mukasey properly repositioned past-FGM claims within the
larger structure of asylum law. In his opinion, he instructed
immigration judges and the BIA to address "at the outset" whether the
applicant has established persecution on account of membership in a
particular social group. 12  According to Mukasey, "[d]eciding that
issue-and defining the particular social group of which the applicant
is a part-is fundamental to the analysis of which partyl bears the
burden of proof and what the nature of that burden is." 1  Mukasey
recognized FGM as a type or example of the sort of persecution that
comes about as a result of the applicant's status in a particular social
group. Asylum cases involving past FGM will be analyzed according
to the nexus the applicant presents between the harm and her
enumerated, social-group ground: the proper and uniform manner by
which all social group asylum claims are analyzed.
social group who suffered past persecution, 'there is no chance that she would be personally
[persecuted] again by the procedure."') (citing Ofori v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 615 (7th Cir.
2003), vacated, Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (A.G. 2008). This was the only part of the
BIA's opinion that approached the applicant's social group membership.
119. Beety, supra note 115, at 241. In her Comment (published in the Winter of 2008),
Beety notes the problems associated with the standards of asylum for mutilated women. She
suggests bringing political opinion asylum applications based on political persecution, and
also social-group applications based on gender and culture. My argument is that Mukasey's
Opinion has made the option of gender-based claims a stronger possibility.
120. Matter of A-T-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 617, 623 (A.G. 2008).
121. Id.
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B. Correcting an Arbitrary and Unfair Distinction between Asylum
Applications
Prior to Mukasey's opinion, an arbitrary distinction had
emerged within the FGM-asylum case law as a result of its singular or
different status in comparison to other social-group applications.
Kasinga opened the door for the asylum applications of women of a
particular social group who had not yet been subjected to FGM, and
who fcared and opposed the practice.1 22 However, the BIA and the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits' analyses effectively close the door to all
applicants who have already been subjected to the practice. The case
law was developing so that women fearing persecution in the form of
FGM had viable social-group asylum applications, but those women
belonging to the same social groups who had already experienced the
procedure did not.
According to Mukasey, the BIA should be required to
reposition FGM claims within the larger asylum law structure. By
characterizing FGM as an injury capable of repetition, Mukasey has
prevented the government from succeeding in rebuttal by merely
asserting that the persecution already happened and cannot happen
again. Mukasey makes clear that the analysis should not rest on the
persecution itself, i.e., how it is defined and characterized, whether it is
capable of repetition, and the like. Rather, when an applicant shows
that she suffered past persecution in the form of FGM based on
membership in a particular social group, it is presumed that her life or
freedom would be threatened upon her return to her native country on
account of the same statutory grounds. 123 As a result of his analysis,
both asylum claims involving fear of FGM in the future and past
occurrences of FGM are analyzed as social-group applications, with
FGM qualifying as the persecution on account of membership within
that social group, as opposed to FGM-applications that focus solely on
the persecution itself. 24 To rebut the presumption of future
persecution in applications involving FGM, the government has to
show that the applicant is no longer at risk for persecution on account
of her membership within a particular social group, instead of showing
that the applicant is no longer at risk because the particular act of
persecution suffered by the victim could not occur again.
25
122. See generally In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
123. Id. at 622.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2008)).
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C. FGM as Indicative of Larger Cultural and Social Structures and
Practices that Subjugate the Female
Mukasey's analysis suggests that adjudicators should recognize
FGM applications as social-group applications that carry a particular
form of persecution; FGM is an example of the type of persecution
that women within certain patriarchal societies and cultures confront.
According to various health and human rights organizations, including
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the World
Health Organization, FGM is a "manifestation of gender inequality
that is deeply entrenched in social, economic and political
structures."12 FGM represents society's control over women, much
like foot-binding in China and the practices of dowry and child
marriage. 127 In Mohammed, the Ninth Circuit noted how an asylum
applicant claiming FGM as past persecution creates a presumption that
the applicant would be a victim of other human rights violations upon
her return to her native country, such as subordination within her
society's patriarchal structure and subjection to rape.' 28 In addition, the
BIA in Kasinga noted how rape, sexual abuse, domestic violence,
infanticide, and FGM are all forms of mistreatment primarily directed
at girls and women, and they may serve as evidence of past
persecution on account of one or more of the statutory asylum
grounds.1 29 FGM is not a singular form of persecution, but one that
arises for women within certain cultures or societies that either support
or tolerate male domination and female subjugation.
D. Matter of A-T- as Making Way for Gender-Based Asylum Claims
By focusing the analysis in past-FGM cases on the nexus
between the applicant's membership in the particular social group and
the persecution that results, 130 Mukasey opened the door for bringing
gender-based asylum applications on social-group grounds,
contributing to a just and natural expansion of our asylum law that has
126. Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, supra note 20,
at 5.
127. Id.
128. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 789-800 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing state
department reports on country conditions in Somalia, where over ninety-eight percent of
women are subjected to FGM).
129. In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
130. Mukaskey particularly noted the language in Kasinga that explained how FGM is
practiced as a part of an overall scheme "to overcome sexual characteristics of young women
of the tribe." Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617, 623 (A.G. 2008).
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received worldwide support. For example, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) published guidelines in 2002
on how to bring social-group claims based on gender,131 and the
highest courts of the United Kingdom and Australia, in addition to an
influential New Zealand tribunal, have all accepted asylum
applications where the social group is defined by gender. 32 In
addition, scholars have long advocated for the widespread acceptance
of gender-based asylum applications.133 Finally, the Ninth Circuit in
Mohammed noted that a social group of "girls or women of a particular
clan or nationality (or even in some circumstances females in
general)... is simply a logical application of our law."1 34
Critics of expanding the particular social group category to
allow gender-based asylum applications share a fear of the
"floodgates," namely where all females, or females of a certain tribal
affiliation, nation, or culture, could be eligible for asylum if they have
been persecuted on account of being a female within that particular
131. United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees, Gender-Related Persecution within the
context ofArticle 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees (May 2002), available at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d58ddef4.pdf ("It is
an established principle that the refugee definition as a whole should be interpreted with an
awareness of possible gender dimensions in order to determine accurately claims to refugee
status."). See also United Nations High Comrn'r. for Refugees, Guidelines on the Protection
of Refugee Women, (Jul. 1991), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3310.html.
132. Musalo, Karen & Stephen Knight, Asylum for Victims of Gender Violence: An
Overview of the Law, and an Analysis of 45 Unpublished Decisions, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS
(Dec. 2003) (citing Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1999] 2 All E.R.
546, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa /Id 199899
/ldjudgmt/jd990325/islam0l.htm; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v.
Khawar, [2002] HCA 14, available at http://
scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/highcourt/0/2002/0/2002041114.htm; Refugee Appeal No.
71427/99 [1999] (New Zealand), available at
http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/default.asp). See generally Danette Gomez, Comment,
Last in Line-The United States Trails Behind in Recognizing Gender-Based Asylum Claims,
25 WHrTIER L. REv. 959 (2004). Gomez discusses how the U.S. is generally considered
"behind" in accepting gender-based asylum applications. Id. at 978. She describes the gender-
asylum models used by other countries, and suggests how the U.S. could adopt these
approaches to keep pace with international human rights norms. Id. at 978-85.
133. E.g. Beety, supra note 115, at 263-65; Shanyn Gillespie, Note, Terror in the Home:
The Failure of US. Asylum Law to Protect Battered Women and a Proposal to Right the
Wrong of R-A-, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 131, 150 (2003); see generally Musalo, supra note
53. Others have advocated for amending the asylum statutory grounds to add a "gender"
category. E.g. Jenny-Brooke Condon, Comment, Asylum Law's Gender Paradox, 33 SETON
HALL L. REv. 207 (2002); Tanya Domenica Bosi, Note, Yadegar-Sargis v. INS: Unveiling the
Discriminatory World of U.S. Asylum Laws: The Necessity to Recognize a Gender Category,
28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 777, 803-04 (2003-2004).
134. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 n.17 (9th Cir. 2005).
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group.' 35 The fear of the floodgates originated around Kasinga, when
those that opposed her grant of asylum argued that millions of women
around the world, per year, are subject to female genital mutilation and
thus predicted that the U.S. would be flooded with women seekin
asylum on that basis. 136 Those women, however, never materialized.1M
Canada's experience is also instructive; in the two years following
Canada's recognition of domestic violence as a valid basis for asylum,
only two percent of the total 40,000 refugee claims filed were gender-
based.' 3
8
There are several explanations for why the number of gender-
based asylum seekers does not increase with the legal recognition of
their claims.1 39 First, women who have legitimate claims for gender-
based asylum are from countries where they have little or no rights, a
situation which greatly limits their ability to leave their countries to
search for protection. 140 Second, these women are usually the primary
caretakers for their children and even extended family; thus they have
to make the difficult decision to either leave their family behind, or
expose them to the risks of fleeing to another country. 141 Finally,
female asylum seekers often have little control over family resources,
making it nearly impossible for them to have the means to travel to
another country to seek asylum unless she has her family's permission
or help.1
42
Nevertheless, applications for asylum into the United States
based on gender-based harms generally fare better when the
particularized social group is highly particularized, such as Kasinga's
"young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had
FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice."' 143 In
her discussion of the "floodgates" concern, Valena Elizabeth Beety,
author of the article "Reframing Asylum Standards for Mutilated
Women," notes the Tenth and Second Circuit's interpretations of the
135. See Gillespie, supra note 133, at 157; Gomez, supra note 132, at 985; Karen
Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call to
(Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 119, 132 (Winter 2007). Its premise is that
acceptance of gender-based asylum will result in thousands, or tens of thousands, of women
arriving at U.S. borders to request asylum. Id.
136. Musalo, supra note 135, at 132.
137. Id. at 133.
138. Gillespie, supra note 133, at 157.




143. In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).
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matter. 144 The Second Circuit particularly noted that the "proper
balance to strike is to interpret 'particular social group' broadly [...]
while interpreting 'on account of strictly (such that an applicant must
prove that these characteristics are a central reason why she has been,
or may be, targeted for persecution)."'' 45 Under this analysis, the
floodgates will not open to a large group of asylum applicants because
the nexus analysis will tighten. The applicant will need to show that
she was persecuted on account of her status as a female, because she is
a female in a culture or country that acquiesces to the oppression of
women on a broad scale. 146 Thus, the bonds of trust, loyalty,
protection, and assistance between her and her country have been
broken and replaced by the relation of an oppressor to a victim. 
147
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, Mukasey has imposed upon the BIA and has
provided to the federal circuits the proper guidance for analyzing
asylum applications brought by victims of past FGM. Mukasey
corrected the singular and different position held by FGM-related
applications, where they were analyzed in terms of the persecution
itself instead of their legal bases. He prevented the formation of an
arbitrary distinction between asylum applicants, whereby all
applications brought by victims of past FGM would have been denied,
but applications brought by women who had not yet undergone FGM
but feared it would have been viable. By considering the rebuttal
analysis in terms of the statutory grounds instead of the type of
persecution the applicant suffers, FGM can be more readily observed
by adjudicators as one of the many types of persecution that women of
certain social groups face. The focus turns to the social group of
women, and how its members suffer as a result of belonging to that
144. Beety, supra note 115, at 264.
145. Id. (citing Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2006)). Notably, the Real ID
Act of 2005 made this "central reason" analysis mandatory, and thus provides for this
tightening of the nexus requirement. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (3)(b)(1)(A) (2009).
146. Note the difference between an asylum applicant that seeks protection from a
country that tolerates a patriarchal culture and an asylum applicant that has personally
experienced, or fears personally experiencing, some form of gender-based harm, which the
government is unable or unwilling to prevent because of the country's tolerance of the
subjugation of women. The asylum applicant must fear persecution specific to her, and that
persecution must be on account of her membership within a subjugated group. Thus, every
woman subject to the oppression of a patriarchal culture is not eligible for asylum under this
formulation. The applicant must fear or have experienced persecution specific to her person,
i.e., persecution that is the result of her status as a female.
147. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 235 (B.I.A. 1985).
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group. Mukasey's opinion opened the door for gender-based asylum
applications on particular social-group grounds, applications that
would accommodate women who are persecuted and subjugated solely
because of their sex.
